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USIB-D-41. 12/22  
(COMOR-D-7/49)  
29 July 1966  
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Report of the NSAM 156 Committee on "Political and Security Aspects of Non-Military Applications of Satellite Earth-Sensing"

REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-41. 12/19 (COMOR-D-7/47)  
11 July 1966, Limited Distribution  
b. USIB-D-41. 12/21 (COMOR-D-7/48)  
14 July 1966, Limited Distribution

1. In restricted session at the USIB meeting on 28 July 1966 with the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (D/NRO) present, [ ] briefly explained the background of the subject report (attachment to reference b.), and noted that it was now appropriate for the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) to address the recommendations in subparagraphs 6a. and b. on page 10 which the Board was asked to review. He noted that the immediate question was a method of conducting such a review. [ ] suggested that the Board consider assigning these recommendations for study and report to either the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) or the group recently formed under [ ] pursuant to paragraph 7b. of reference a.

2. Chairman Helms announced that this group, which had been formed for the purpose of analyzing the problem of removing KH-4 products from the T-KH control system and downgrading the material to the Secret classification, was composed of:

Chairman - [ ]  
State - Mr. Robert H. Baraz  
DIA - [ ]  
NPIC - [ ]  
CIA - [ ]

NRO review(s) completed.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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
Mr. Helms thought that the recommendations could be referred to this group since it will be dealing with a similar problem. He would propose that a report be submitted to the Board in three weeks.

3. Admiral Taylor said that he would prefer to send the recommendations to COMOR. He noted that the [redacted] group already has a lot to do to complete its assignment. Moreover, the recommendations in 6a. and b. are closely related to the sanitization and downgrading function of COMOR, and COMOR would have the benefit of full participation by the military services. General Davis concurred with Admiral Taylor and noted the interests of the Army planners involved in this matter.

4. Admiral Taylor suggested, and Chairman Helms agreed that concurrently the D/NRO could consult with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on the nature of the problems involved. Dr. Flax said that he had been in consultation with NASA on these matters for about six months. He noted that recommendation 6a. poses many problems that are not obvious on the surface. For example, the D/NRO noted the importance of drawing a very fine distinction in choosing between a Secret or Top Secret classification, since most contractors have a Secret clearance but very few have a Top Secret clearance.

5. The Acting State Member did not believe that recommendation 6 was the kind of question with which COMOR was used to dealing since it is basically a requirements committee. [redacted] noted that, as the D/NRO pointed out, recommendation 6a. raises problems which are basically policy questions or which positions have now been agreed upon by the high level NSAM 156 committee, which included representatives of most USIB agencies. He would support assigning the recommendations to the [redacted] ad hoc group to study the question of whether, given the agreed policy needs, there are serious security or practical obstacles to relaxing the control system somewhat.

6. Admiral Taylor pointed out that COMOR is charged with security as well as requirements.



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7. Dr. Flax doubted whether recommendation 6a. would help NASA much since their need is for completely unclassified treatment. He suggested that NASA be asked what use and contribution would be made if a Secret or Top Secret classification were retained. The D/NRO thought that the last sentence of 6a. reflected the real reasoning behind this recommendation, and Mr. Helms agreed.

8. After asking each USIB Principal for his views on the choice of COMOR or the  group, Chairman Helms determined that the consensus of the Board would best be met by constituting COMOR as an ad hoc group to study and report to USIB in three weeks on recommendations 6a. and b. of the subject report, with due consideration to the broad implications of this report from the intelligence viewpoint. He also determined that the consensus of the Board was that the DCI and the D/NRO should give appropriate consideration to recommendation 7 of the subject report, which was, over the objection of the Acting State Member, excluded from the work of the COMOR group.



Executive Secretary

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